

AN ATLAS OF FAR EASTERN POLITICS

by

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and

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with a foreword by

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Foreword

BY SIR ARTHUR SALTER

The major changes in international politics are usually marked by the introduction of new members into the family of Great Powers. So long as the protagonists of the international drama continue the same, the pattern of the play changes little. Certain combinations of Powers are determined by geography, by economic and strategic considerations, and by the natural tendency of international forces to come to a balance; even internal revolution as a rule leads a country to only a temporary aberration from its 'natural' allies.

It is when new Powers appear on the scene that the pattern is drastically recast. In the eighteenth century international politics was transformed by the rise of Prussia and the intrusion into Europe of Russia. A similar revolution has taken place in our own generation with the *arrival* among the Great Powers of Japan; and as the present struggle proceeds, the world is beginning to realize what may be the future strength and importance of a unified China.

Sixty years ago Far Eastern affairs were a subject for the curious, an intriguing matter for scholars and for experts in Foreign Ministries, but rarely a cause for discussion or anxiety at Cabinet councils. To-day all this is changed. How changed was shown in

FOREWORD

August of this year when the world trembled lest an incident in an obscure corner of Manchuria should light off universal war.

From now on the Far East must be in all our calculations. We can make no move in Europe without an eye on Singapore and Tokyo; no violence can happen in Shanghai or its vast hinterland which is entirely of indifference to us.

As a result there has lately been a quite unprecedented public desire to master the main facts about Far Eastern politics, and this book by Mr. Hudson and Miss Rajchman is particularly timely. By a remarkable achievement in compression and lucid exposition the authors have given us in the text and maps the facts required for interpreting the present situation in the Far East and indeed almost any conceivable situation likely to arise there. The book is of equal value to the historian, the journalist, the man of public affairs, and to the citizen anxious to keep abreast of the times. Mr. Hudson has once more, as in *Far East in World Politics*, shown how the modern technique of political analysis can be combined with the lucidity and elegance of an earlier period of political literature; and Miss Rajchman's maps are worthy of this high standard. For many years this book is likely to be a standard reference work.

August 1938

AUTHORS' PREFACE

The purpose of this book is to provide a commentary in a geographical framework on the long-term factors of Far Eastern politics. With a great war in progress the situation is changing rapidly from day to day and many familiar landmarks may suddenly be blotted out in the near future, but the flood of events, however turbulent it may be, still has its movement in a setting of permanent or relatively permanent facts—the physical structure of lands and seas, the ethnography shaped by long ages of history, the natural resources and main developments of agriculture, industry and commerce, the principal lines of communication and the fundamental relations of strategic position. An attempt has here been made to indicate these both by words and by maps.

Our grateful thanks are due to Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond for information with regard to naval bases in the Pacific and to Mr. G. Wint for much valuable assistance and advice in the preparation of material for the book.

G. F. HUDSON
M. RAJCHMAN

August 1938

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Chapter I

THE APPROACHES TO THE FAR EAST

There have been in history three ways of approach to the region of the world known as the Far East: the first, by sea from the Indian Ocean; the second, overland from the countries of the Middle East; and the third, across the Pacific from North or South America.

The trans-Pacific approach belongs to modern times; it dates only from the voyage of Magellan in 1519. The Polynesians navigated vast expanses of the Pacific in outrigger canoes, but there is no evidence that they ever jumped the gaps that separate Hawaii and Easter Island from the Americas. Disabled Japanese junks have occasionally been carried by wind and current to the coast of California, but no definite knowledge of America seems to have come to Asia by such accidents. The pre-Columbian natives of the New World were not seafarers, and the close proximity of North America and Asia at the Bering Strait, however important for the peopling of the Americas with human stock, belongs to a zone too remote from the areas of old civilization to have significance in history. It may be said without considerable qualification that up to the sixteenth century of our era the Pacific Ocean imposed an absolute limit to human intercourse east of Asia.

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The approaches by sea and land from the Middle East, on the other hand, have been in use from remote antiquity, and an account of them must reveal the natural boundaries of the Far Eastern region, for it is just the main obstacles to communication with the farther parts of Asia which determine the most suitable limits for the three conventional divisions of the continent into Near, Middle and Far East. It is always possible, of course, to divide an area of the earth's surface merely according to a scale of remoteness, but such a regional partition should have more of geographical significance than this, and the three degrees of removal which we recognize in viewing Asia from Europe actually do correspond to definable natural areas.

Leaving out of account the Arctic littoral, Asia has three coastlines: to the west, the Mediterranean and Black Sea, to the south, the Indian Ocean, and to the east, the Pacific. Before the making of the canal, the isthmus of Suez barred any access for shipping from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, and even now it remains a very definite dividing line. From the Indian Ocean to the Pacific there is a continuous natural seaway, but the Malay Peninsula, reaching south to within two degrees of the Equator, makes a very sharp corner at the south-eastern extremity of Asia, and Singapore is no less of a boundary than Suez. The three Asiatic coastlines are thus clearly separated, and their hinterlands may be identified with the three regions of the East; by this criterion the Near East includes Turkey and Syria (with Egypt), the Middle East, Arabia, Iraq, Iran and India, and the Far East, Indo-China and China.

These divisions by relation to coastline would not, however, have so much significance if they did not correspond to two well-marked insulating barriers inland. The Ararat highlands and

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the Hamad (Syrian desert) intervene between the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf lands, and formerly set an eastward limit to that Mediterranean-centred political creation, the Roman empire. Similarly, a vast mountain system comprising the Pamirs-Tibet and Yunnan-Burma highlands shuts off China from India and Iran, the mountains being reinforced to the north of Tibet by the deserts of Sinkiang. These two great ramparts of natural obstruction may be regarded as fixing the confines of the Near, Middle and Far Eastern regions.

The Pamirs-Burma mountain system affords by far the more impervious barrier of the two, and accounts for the high degree of isolation which was the condition of Far Eastern history until quite recently. Though the isolation of the Far East has often been exaggerated, it remains true that China has been in the past more secluded from cultural contact and interaction with an outer world than any section of the region extending from Spain to Bengal; the history of China is more self-contained than that of India, Persia, Greece or Western Europe. The Achaemenid kings of ancient Persia, Alexander the Great and the Arab Caliphs all bridged the gap between Near and Middle East and ruled from the shores of the Mediterranean to the Pamirs, but none of them passed the Pamirs and penetrated to China; nor did any Indian kingdom extend its sway beyond the Himalayas or east of the Salween. Buddhism was propagated from India throughout the Far East, but it never displaced the traditional native religion of China; Islam also reached China, but it never created there a new epoch of history as it did in India. The snows of Sarikol and the Kum Tagh sands repelled the temporal power of Persepolis or Baghdad and weakened the impact of those spiritual forces which they could not forbid.

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By longitude Tibet and Sinkiang, lying north of the Ganges plain, should be comprised within the Middle East, but the course of history which has made them to this day—at least nominally—parts of China, corresponds to a strong geographical predisposition; they are more accessible from the east than from the south or west, though just lately, since the construction of the Turksib railway, the gravitational pull of the Soviet Union has been very strong in Sinkiang. From the great peak of Khan Tengri (23,620 feet) in the T'ien-shan south-west of Kulja round to the great gorge by which the Dihong cuts its way down from Tibet to become the Brahmaputra in the plains of Assam, the formal frontier of China follows the line of the most tremendous mountain rampart in the world. The T'ien-shan, the Pamirs, the Karakorum and the Himalayas are all mountain ranges on a grand scale, and the last-named is backed by the vast plateau of Tibet, a country where many tens of thousands of square miles lie higher than the summit of Mont Blanc. On these upper levels the way for caravans has always been arduous in the extreme; Marco Polo tells of the forty days' journey on the high Pamirs, where 'in all this way you shall come to no town, nor habitation, nor grass, and therefore it is needfull for those that do travel that way to carry with them provision and victuals for themselves and their horses'.

It is possible to avoid the high mountains by going to the north of the T'ien-shan and then south-east to China *via* Hami. There is a clear way from west to east across Asia through the gap between the T'ien-shan and the mountains of the Altai system. This way went the caravan route from the Sea of Azov to Peiping described by Pegolotti in the fourteenth century, and this way runs the road from the Turksib railway to Lanchow by which

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Russian munitions are supplied to China in the present war. But for access to China from India or Persia such a route has always meant a long *détour* added on to a distance already excessive for commerce before the age of mechanical transport. For an approach from the direction of the lower Volga it was more convenient, but, whatever its natural advantages, it has been at most times in history rendered extremely difficult for trade or travel by the nomadic barbarism of the steppes through which it passes. The same applies in an even greater degree to the open country to the north of the Altai; here there could be no question of a route from Indian or Mediterranean countries to the Far East, and the opening of trans-Asian communications in such high latitudes depended on the development of Russia and her expansion eastward through Siberia—it dates, therefore, only from the seventeenth century.

Turning from the north to the south of the great central mountain block of Asia, we find obstruction of a somewhat different kind, but no less formidable. From the south-eastern corner of the Tibetan plateau mountain ranges splay out towards the south, reaching the sea in Tennasserim, where the Malay Peninsula juts out from the land-mass of Indo-China. These mountains diminish rapidly in height from north to south—though there are large areas over 10,000 feet as far south as lat. 25°—and on this border there are no perils from blizzard and avalanche or complications of desert and nomadic marauders. But an exceptionally high annual rainfall—the world's record of 424 inches average is held by Cherrapunji in the Khasi hills in Assam—clothes the hill tracts facing the Bay of Bengal with dense tropical vegetation, which makes them hardly less difficult to traverse than the loftier heights of the Pamirs or

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Himalayas. Nor has the human population been more favourable to economic and cultural contacts of a high order than it has in the steppe and alpine grasslands of Central Asia. An environment of mountain forests has kept a wide region in the interior of Indo-China in various stages of primitive culture more or less impervious to influences from areas of higher civilization to west, east and south; the Naga, Mishmi, Kachin and Wa tribes were head-hunters until yesterday, and the more civilized Shans and Karens, forming numerous petty principalities in their hill-girt valleys, have always stoutly resisted incorporation in any large, centralized state.

With such obstacles to overland communication between the Middle and Far East, it might seem, nevertheless, that the continuous seaway from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific would afford a sufficiently close contact. Yet the Malay Peninsula has been up to modern times a strong factor of separation, for not only did it mean a long, roundabout voyage from the Bay of Bengal to the South China Sea, but it diverted maritime traffic into waters where piracy used to flourish with peculiar vigour. Malaya, Sumatra and Borneo, with their numerous adjacent small islands, lying within the zone of equatorial rain forest, always remained a region of backward culture, the inhabitants of which preferred freebooting to regular trade, so that shipping on the way between India and China was at all times in hazard. With the arrival of gun-armed European ships in the seas round Malaya the pirate proa met more than its match, but in earlier centuries the development of commerce in these waters was seriously impeded by a piracy too ubiquitous and elusive ever to be suppressed. Even after Malacca had grown into a great emporium for trade from Java and the Moluccas, as well as from

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Siam and China, the institutions of orderly economic life were little in evidence, and the Italian traveller Varthema, who visited Malacca in 1506, complains that 'one cannot walk about at night here, because people are killed like dogs, and the merchants who come sleep on their ships. . . . The king has a governor to administer justice for foreigners, but the people of the country take the law into their own hands, and they are the worst race that was ever created on earth'.

In view of the length and dangers of the voyage through the Straits of Malacca and round Malaya, trade tended to make use of a portage across the isthmus of Kra, renouncing the advantages of continuous voyage, but reducing the risks from piracy. The isthmus of Kra appears to have been the main centre for the diffusion of Indian influences in Indo-China during the early centuries of our era,¹ and later a route from Bangkok to Tenasserim was much in use for the export of Chinese porcelain to Islamic countries—a trade well attested by the quantities of broken wares recovered from the earth in this area.

With or without the Kra short cut, however, the 'south-east passage' failed throughout ancient and medieval times to attain primacy as a means of access to the Far East, and the overland routes through Sinkiang, in spite of their difficulties, retained most of the traffic there was. The main trans-Asian caravan route in the second century A.D. ran from Antioch in Syria to Ctesiphon (on the Tigris below Baghdad) and thence by the modern Hamadan, Damghan, Merv, Balkh and the Pamir passes to Tashkurgan in Sarikol, where there was a mart for Chinese raw silk, which was brought from China Proper

¹ The Khmer culture of Cambodia, represented by the famous ruins of Angkor, thus received its initial stimulus.

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through Sinkiang either by the route to the north of the Taklamakan desert (Anhsi-Hami-Turfan-Karashar-Kuchar-Aksu-Kashgar) or by that to the south of it (Anhsi-Tunhuang-Charkhlik-Charchan-Keriya-Khotan-Yarkand). No road to the north of the T'ien-shan appears to have been used in that period, but later on a trade route from the Black Sea to Samarkand *via* Astrakhan and Khiva, which became important from the sixth century onwards, was extended to China by way of Kulja, Urumchi¹ and Hami. In the time of Marco Polo both the trans-Pamir and Kulja-Urumchi routes were in use, corresponding to lines of approach to China from south and north of the Caspian respectively; Marco himself, coming through Persia, travelled by Kashgar, Khotan and Charchan, but the elder Polos came from Sarai on the Volga to Bokhara, and they probably went on by Kulja.

From India and from the Bay of Bengal there were two direct overland routes to China: one across the Himalayas and Tibet *via* Lhasa, and the other by Burma and Yunnan. So great were the disadvantages, however, of both these ways that the main lines of communication between India and China, during the period when Buddhism was propagated from India all over the Far East, were through Sinkiang. From Káshmir there was always the road to Kashgar by Hunza and the Mintaka pass (15,450 feet), or the Balkh-Kashgar road could be reached further west *via* Chitral or Kabul—a roundabout way of getting from the Ganges to the Yellow River, but the best available in pre-modern conditions of travel.

After the arrival of European shipping in the Indian Ocean with the voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1498, the sea route round

¹ Now officially Tihwa, but better known by its old name.

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

Malaya was opened up more than ever before, and became by far the most important approach to the Far East. The traditional overland routes fell into decline, and, in particular, the old Khotan-Charchan route was almost completely abandoned. On the other hand, the last four centuries have seen the development by Western powers of two new lines of approach: the trans-Siberian and trans-Pacific.

The Russians, pressing eastward to the north of the Altai, reached Lake Baikal early in the seventeenth century and opened trade with China across Mongolia along the route Irkutsk-Kiakhta-Urga-Peiping. But when in the last decade of the nineteenth century the building of a transcontinental railway was undertaken by Russia, it was decided to carry it, not across the Gobi to Peiping and Tientsin, but to the most southerly Russian port on the Pacific. The political situation in 1896 having enabled the Russians to get permission from China to build the line through Manchuria, it became possible to approach China overland from Russia without having to cross either high mountains or deserts. The trans-Siberian was eventually linked with the Chinese railway system by the connection Harbin-Mukden-Peiping, entering China not from the north-west or north, but from the *north-east*. The Russians have had plans ever since the 'nineties for a short-cut line from the Trans-Siberian to China Proper *via* Urga or Hami, but no such railway has yet been built, though there is now a line as far as Urga (Ulan Bator, the capital of Outer Mongolia).

The approach to Asia across the Pacific dates only, as has been already pointed out, from Magellan's voyage in 1519. Up to about 1850 ships came from the direction of Cape Horn or the Magellan Straits, having sailed round South America from

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Europe or New England; or they came from the Pacific ports of Latin America, Mexico being the most northerly region of European settlement on the Pacific coast. Then, with the rapid growth of San Francisco as a port of the U.S.A. from 1848 onward, shipping began to sail thence almost due west—actually with a slant southward through six degrees of latitude—to Shanghai, which had been first opened to foreign trade in 1842. Japan, which had hitherto held place as the far end of the Far East, the Cipangu which Marco Polo heard of but never reached, lay in the path of the new oceanic trade route, and it was the Americans coming across the Pacific, not the Europeans approaching from the south, who in 1853 compelled the self-secluded Japanese to enter into relations with the outer world.




I. WAYS OF ACCESS TO CHINA (MODERN)

Chapter II

LANDS AND PEOPLES

The region of the Far East may be divided into three zones: a southern zone extending from lat. 10° south of the Equator to 20° north of it, a middle one from 20° N. to 40° N., and a northern from 40° N. to the Arctic. The southern includes Indonesia, Malaya and most of Indo-China, the middle covers China Proper, Tibet and the main areas of Korea and Japan, and the northern comprises Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia—a vast continental area which in its relation to China Proper may conveniently be termed the Northland.

The southern zone of the Far East lies entirely within the tropics. It includes an equatorial zone, extending to about five degrees on both sides of the Equator, in which there is hardly any seasonal variation of temperature or rainfall; this climatic belt appears to be very unfavourable to human progress, and to such environmental influence must be attributed the fact that Indian civilization, diffused over the nearer parts of Indonesia and Indo-China, never took root in Sumatra, Malaya or Borneo, but flourished remarkably in Cambodia and Siam to the north and in Java to the south—countries with definite alternations of wet and dry seasons. The southern zone of the Far East contains no deserts; it has almost everywhere a very high annual



2. CLIMATIC REGIONS OF THE FAR EAST

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rainfall and is for the most part heavily forested in its natural state. The rains of Indo-China are provided by the monsoon wind system of south-eastern Asia. In winter the winds blow outward towards the south-west, south and south-east from an intense high-pressure belt over Mongolia, Sinkiang and southern Siberia; in summer the direction is reversed and they blow inward from the Indian Ocean and China Seas as bearers of rain. Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands, which are affected climatically by the arid land surface of Australia, have a monsoon system of their own with wet west and dry east winds.

The middle zone of the Far East may be reckoned as sub-tropical; it lies within the sphere of the monsoons, and has wet summers and dry winters like the lands to the south, but it is distinguished by a considerable annual range of temperature and by a marked shrinking of rainfall towards the north-west, leading to sub-arid conditions on the borders of Mongolia. China has everywhere a hot summer, but it has the coldest winter—south to the Nanling mountains—for any part of the world in parallel latitudes; bitterly cold north-west winds sweep from Mongolia over the North China Plain, and the Poyang lake to the south of the Yangtse is sometimes frozen over below the latitude of Cairo. The South China littoral, the more sheltered valleys of western China, and Japan, except for its north-western coasts, escape these severe winters, and the contrast of these areas with North China is emphasized by the still more important differences in the matter of rainfall. Mean annual rainfalls are 85 inches at Hongkong, 58 at Tokyo, 45 at Shanghai, 25 at Peiping and 14 at Taiyuan (Shansi). Most of China south of the Yangtse has over 50 inches of rain in a year and is naturally a green and well-forested land; the same holds good of

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Japan, where luxuriant timber covers nearly all the ground that is not under cultivation. North China, on the other hand, is a region of comparatively low rainfall, declining below 10 inches in parts of Kansu; in good years the rains are sufficient for agriculture, but they often fail to reach the necessary minimum and the resulting crop failures produce famine. Much of North China is now practically treeless; this is partly due to artificial deforestation—always terribly effective in such marginal lands—but the country, even in early times, can only have been lightly timbered as compared with South China, Indo-China or Japan. Its character predestined it to be the original seat of the great independent civilization of the Far East, for under neolithic cultural conditions the zone of decisive initial progress was the sub-tropical, sub-arid, the grade between the well-watered forest land and the steppe or desert. Indian civilization arose in the dry lands of Sind and the Punjab, and only later spread over the rain-favoured plains of the Ganges; similarly, Chinese civilization arose in the basin of the Yellow River and had attained there a high level more than a thousand years before we find evidence of any such development in the valleys of the Yangtse, the Si-kiang or the Mekong.

The contrast between the Yellow River and Yangtse lands in the time of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 221) was noted by the Chinese historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien, who describes the latter as a 'large territory sparsely populated, where people eat rice and drink fish soup; where land is tilled with fire and hoed with water; where people collect fruits and shellfish for food and enjoy self-sufficiency without commerce. The region is fertile and suffers no famine. Hence the people are lazy and poor and do not bother to accumulate wealth; south of the Yangtse and the

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Hwai there are neither hungry nor frozen people, nor a family which owns a thousand gold'.¹ Yet the Yangtse valley came in course of time to be no less intensively cultivated and densely peopled than the old China of the Yellow River, and this result was brought about by colonization from the north; the natural fertility of the south country was made to yield its wealth to a technique of agriculture developed under more arduous conditions.

The land areas of the southern and middle zones of the Far East are everywhere capable of cultivation except for mountainous tracts and the higher plateaux of Tibet. In the third zone, however, we come to an immense region over by far the greater part of which agriculture is forbidden either by aridity or frigidity of climate. The Northland, extending from the Great Wall of China to the Arctic Ocean, is divisible into three sub-zones: one of steppe and desert in the forties of latitude, a second, of forest (generally sparse east of the Yenisei), and a third, of treeless 'tundra' above the Arctic Circle. Of the steppe region only the fringes can be cultivated, but the whole provides pasture for animals and has thus been traditionally the domain of horse-riding, tent-dwelling, milk-sustained herdsmen, who represent a culture diametrically opposed to that of the sedentary, agricultural Chinese. These nomads have always been the neighbours of China to the north, and until recently were one of the main factors in Chinese history.

Before the coming of the Russians regular agriculture in the Northland was confined to the piedmont oases of Sinkiang and the pale of Chinese settlement in southern Manchuria. The belt

¹ Ssu-ma Ch'ien, *chüan* 102. Quoted by Ch'ao-ting Chi, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History*, p. 98.

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of arable land along the present Trans-Siberian railway to the north of Mongolia and in northern Manchuria remained wilderness, being cut off from Chinese colonization or influence by nomad-infested steppe and lacking river communication with the south—the fact that all the great rivers of northern Asia flow either to the Arctic Ocean (the Ob, Yenisei and Lena) or to the northerly Okhotsk Sea (the Amur) has contributed much to the historic isolation of Siberia. Up to the middle of the seventeenth century there was nothing in north-eastern Asia above the forty-fifth parallel of latitude except a barbarism with gradations from the hunting-and-fishing economy of the Chukchis and Ghilaks through the reindeer-keeping of the Yakuts and Tungus to the horse-and-cattle nomadism of the Mongols.

The Northland Pacific littoral has a character of its own which is extremely adverse to human habitation. This region combines the intense cold of the Siberian winter with a chilly, wet summer unfavourable either for agriculture or stock-raising. East of the Stanovoi mountains the northern limit of cereals descends to about the latitude of Paris, and at Vladivostok in the parallel of Marseilles the sea freezes for four months in the year. The climatic conditions closely resemble those of Labrador in similar latitudes on the east coast of North America, and even Soviet planning has not so far made much out of this territory. In former times Possiet Bay was the northern limit for shipping, Chinese, Japanese or Korean, and no attempt was ever made to colonize the coasts beyond.

Turning from environment and basic economic types to ethnography, we find that the whole of the southern and middle zones of the Far East, with the exception of Korea and Japan, is occupied by peoples belonging to three great linguistic families:

NOTE ON MAP 3

This map is intended to indicate the distribution of the principal ethnic types without reference to density of population. For the relative density of population in the provinces of China Proper and Manchuria, see maps 18 and 24.

The Tibetans, Turks, Mongols and Tungus occupy large areas on the map, but with very low density; the Chinese and Russian areas, on the other hand, are generally of high density, and the Chinese and Russians often form the urban population in regions where the native peoples still predominate in the open country. Thus all the towns of Siberia may be counted as Russian and those of the Miao, Shan and Lolo districts of the west and south-west of China as Chinese.

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the Austronesian, the Austroasiatic and the Sinitic. It is worthy of note, as indicating the separateness of the Far Eastern region from very remote times, that neither the Indo-European, Hamito-Semitic nor Dravidian families are represented in the Far East, and that the three Far Eastern families are not represented in Asia farther west than Tibet and central India.

The Austronesian language family comprises three sub-families: Indonesian, Melanesian and Polynesian. Its range extends over Malaya and all the archipelagoes from Sumatra to Easter Island and from Timor to Formosa; it also has a trans-oceanic branch in Madagascar. It covers a large number of distinct spoken languages, of which the most important at the present day are Malay, Javanese, Sundanese and Tagalog—all of the Indonesian sub-family.

The Austroasiatic group includes several languages of backward tribal areas scattered from the South China Sea to central India and two important living tongues—Khmer (Cambodian) and Annamese.¹ Over a wide area between the Bay of Bengal and the Pacific older stocks of Austroasiatic speech have been submerged by later Sinitic-speaking invaders from the north, such as the Burmese and Siamese. The Sinitic family has three branches: Chinese, Tibeto-Burman and Tai (including Siamese, Shan and the Miao dialects of South China); it belongs entirely to the Far East, and has not spread north of the Kunlun mountains and the Great Wall of China except with Chinese colonization in historic times.

The greater part of the Northland was held before the arrival

¹ Annamese is classified by some with the Tai group of the Sinitic family. See, however, J. Przyluski, *Langues austroasiatiques* in *Les Langues du monde*, ed. A. Meillet and M. Cohen, pp. 395-8.

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of the Russians by tongues of the Altaian family, classifiable into Turkish, Mongol and Tungusic branches. This language group, owing to its association with nomadism, is very widely spread; its range extends to the Mediterranean (Turkey), to the Arctic Ocean (the Yakuts) and to the Pacific (the Tungus), but the total of its speakers is small outside the settled communities of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkestan.

Beyond the foregoing threefold classification of Far Eastern languages fall Korean, Japanese and certain tribal languages of the extreme north-east of Siberia and the Primorsk, the affinities of which have not yet been discovered.¹ The geographical distribution of these forms of speech on the farthest rim of Asia suggests that they are survivals comparable to Basque in Europe.

On such ethnic foundations cultural tradition and political state-making have in course of time created unities and differences from which nationalities in the modern sense of the word have been, or are being, formed. Besides the two big indigenous nations of the Far East, the Chinese and the Japanese, there are to-day about a dozen lesser nationalities which have to be taken into account, and in addition, a large number of human beings living in tribal or petty local units and eluding any 'national' classification.

By cultural tradition older than the arrival of Europeans the peoples of the Far East—leaving out of account the more primitive tribal elements—belong to three different domains of civilization: the Chinese, the Indian and the Islamic. The first of

¹ It is held by some that Japanese is related to the Indonesian group and therefore to the Austronesian family of languages, but there is so far no consensus of opinion on the matter among philologists.

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these is native to the Far East, whereas the other two are intrusive from the west.

Chinese civilization, having grown up in the basin of the Yellow River, extended its domain in two ways: through colonization by the Chinese themselves and through the reception of Chinese culture by non-Chinese peoples. The former type of expansion prevailed as far south as Hainan and formed the modern China Proper, including the Yangtse and Si-kiang basins; the latter kind brought Annam, Korea and Japan within the Chinese cultural sphere, all these three countries adopting classical literary Chinese as the language of education and learning.

Indian culture from about the beginning of our era penetrated by colonization and influence Indo-China (except Annam) and the nearer parts of Indonesia. The traditional culture of Siam and Cambodia is thus affiliated, but in Malaya and Indonesia the Hindu-Buddhist influence was superseded by Islam in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and now survives only in Bali. In another direction Indian cultural expansion was even more far-reaching; from the first century A.D. Buddhism was transmitted to China along the silk-trading caravan routes through Sinkiang, and through China it reached also Korea and Japan. Within the sphere of the Chinese literary tradition, however, the Indian religion was always a subsidiary element—except for a while in Japan. More profound was the effect of Buddhism in Tibet, where it assumed the special form known as lamaism and dominated the whole life of the country. From Tibet Lama-Buddhism spread north-eastward to Mongolia, and both in Tibet and Mongolia modern nationalist feeling has its roots in a national 'church', even though it is anti-clerical in tendency.

Following in the wake of India's spiritual expansion, Islam,

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
spreading from Arabia and Iran, likewise reached the Far East on two courses, one to the south and the other to the north. Across the Indian Ocean Arab traders and adventurers propagated their faith among the Malays of Sumatra, who carried it to other parts of Indonesia. The Hindu power in Java was destroyed by the capture of Madjopait in 1478 and Java became entirely Mohammedan. Islam was spread eastward as far as Mindanao, Ceram and Timor, but everywhere except in Java prevailed only in coastal districts, the inland tribes retaining their primitive paganism.

In Central Asia the Turki-speaking people of Sinkiang were converted to Islam as were their kinsmen to the west of the Pamirs. The line between Moslem and Buddhist now corresponds almost exactly to the linguistic division of Turk and Mongol. Further, Islam, cutting across the line of Buddhist expansion from Tibet to Mongolia, established itself in north-west China and created the numerous Chinese-speaking Moslem community known as Tungans, who can hardly be counted as a separate nationality, but form a very distinct and centrifugal section of the Chinese people.

To these formative factors of cultural inheritance must be added, as constituents of nationality, historical traditions of political sovereignty and state-making. In China there is the great tradition of the 'Middle Kingdom' and of the Son of Heaven, who before 1860 could not recognize any other earthly monarch as his equal. In Japan there is the national sovereign of divine descent, who, whatever the chaos of Japanese internal politics, was always the mystical talisman of the 'Yamato race'. Korea, Annam, Cambodia and Siam have their traditions of strong, organized national kingdoms. The Mongols derive an

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intense racial pride from the memory of the empire of Genghiz Khan, and the Tibetans have their long-established sovereignty of the holy Dalai Lama. In Indonesia there is still the memory of the old Javanese empire of Mataram. These historical continuities serve as nuclei for modern national feeling, even when the nationalism is anti-monarchical and destructive of traditional culture; though popular nationalism and its jargon are recent innovations, the main lines of nationality which now exist were already drawn before Europeans ever reached the Far East. To the old ethno-political units, however, the age of European ascendancy has added two more: the Russian, which is the product of immigration from Europe, and the Filipino, which is a creation of Spanish colonialism.



4. POPULATIONS OF FAR EASTERN COUNTRIES

Chapter III

THE WESTERNERS

There are to-day, excluding Manchukuo, nine recognized sovereignties within the confines of the Far East. Of these only three—China, Japan and Siam—belong to indigenous nations; the rest are held by 'Western' nations with their homelands in Europe or North America—Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. All these six powers have acquired their territories in the Far East by some kind of expansion, more or less violent, since a Portuguese squadron first arrived at Malacca in 1509. In the sequel, however, a distinction must be drawn between the Far Eastern lands of the Soviet Union and the 'possessions' of the other Western powers. The latter are in every case imperial ascendencies over areas already well populated, and the ruling nations are represented by mere handfuls of administrators, soldiers, capitalist entrepreneurs and technicians, who form insignificant minorities among the native inhabitants; in Siberia, on the other hand, the Russians have settled on land previously uncultivated, as the English have in Canada or Australia, and form the great majority of the total population, so that Russian nationality, as well as Russian (or Soviet Union) state power, has been established there. The Russians are to-day a Far Eastern nation in a way the British, French and Americans

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are not, though their actual numbers are small to the east of the Yenisei, and their position as a Great Power is based on their wealth of population and resources in Europe and West Siberia.

The history of European commercial and imperial expansion in the Far East begins in 1509, when a Portuguese squadron under Sequiera arrived at Malacca to open trade eleven years after Vasco da Gama had first reached India round the Cape of Good Hope. The usual disputes having arisen, Albuquerque, the Portuguese Captain-General of the Indies, attacked and captured Malacca in 1511. The Portuguese thus acquired a monopoly of the lucrative trade in spices from the Moluccas; to complete their control they annexed the Moluccas in 1522 and held them until 1583, when they were driven out by a rebellion of the natives. Their principal rivals in these waters in the early days were the Spanish, who crossed the Pacific from Mexico and tried to break the Portuguese hold on the Moluccas; failing in this, the Spanish went farther north and conquered the group of islands which they named the Philippines in honour of King Philip II. From Malacca the Portuguese had meanwhile opened up trade with China and Japan, and in China they were granted, in return for services in the suppression of piracy, a lease for a settlement at Macao in 1557. Macao became a Portuguese stronghold and was never lost, though it always remained nominally Chinese territory until it was formally annexed by Portugal in 1845.


With the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch and the English began to make their presence felt in Indonesia. The Dutch in 1619 captured Jacatra in Java and made it their Far Eastern base under the name of Batavia; in 1642 they also took Malacca from the Portuguese, and the latter were finally elimi-

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nated from the Archipelago except for a foothold on the island of Timor, the eastern half of which still belongs to them. The English, who tended more and more to concentrate their attention on India, likewise gave way to the Dutch after a period of rivalry. The Spanish, however, continued to hold the Philippines.

Dutch rule was strongly established in Java and the Moluccas; elsewhere in the islands their control was slight, and numerous petty rajas and sultans retained a somewhat diminished independence. The Dutch secured the monopoly of cloves by exterminating the tree in every island but Amboyna, and when the spice trade ceased to be important, they turned their attention to coffee, which they produced in Java under a system of forced labour. To the north of Indonesia they obtained a monopoly of European trade with Japan from 1639—and retained it until 1854—and made a settlement on the island of Formosa, which they held until they were driven out by exiles from China, partisans of the fallen Ming dynasty, in 1662.

Both China and Japan during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries adopted a policy of restricting foreign trade and residence to particular ports, partly because of their fear of the Catholic Christian missions, which had arrived with the traders and had had a very disturbing effect, especially in Japan; partly because of the desire of the governments to control the trade to their own fiscal advantage; and partly because Far Eastern countries had no system of international diplomatic intercourse and commercial law such as had been evolved in Europe. In China foreign trade was restricted by law to Canton after 1757; in Japan it was confined to Nagasaki, and there allowed only to the Chinese and the Dutch, from 1639. The European nations had to put up with this state of affairs, for up



5. CITIES OF THE FAR EAST

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to the second quarter of the nineteenth century they were not in a position to apply coercion to China or Japan as they applied it to the petty principalities of Indonesia.

The Anglo-French wars from 1792 to 1815 brought English armed forces again into the Far East after Holland had fallen under the control of France. The English captured Malacca in 1795 and occupied Java in 1811; these and other Dutch possessions were restored to Holland in 1814, but in 1819 England acquired Singapore by cession from the Sultan of Johore and made it into a great commercial and strategic centre.

In the final partition of Malaya and Indonesia among the Western powers, none of the native potentates was recognized as sovereign, and dominion was distributed in international law, that is, by treaties between Western Powers, often in advance of conquest, or even of exploration. Large areas of Indonesia were not brought under any European authority until the present century; the conquest of Atjeh in northern Sumatra took some thirty years of campaigning. To-day, however, it can be said that control by the recognized sovereign powers has been made effective throughout the whole region. The British hold all the Malay Peninsula south of Siam either by direct (Straits Settlements) or indirect (Protected Malay States) rule. The Dutch retain Java and the Lesser Sunda Islands, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes and the Moluccas, with the exception of eastern Timor, which belongs to Portugal, and the northern part of Borneo, comprising British North Borneo and the British-protected states of Brunei and Sarawak.¹ The dominion of the Philippines

¹ Brunei was declared under British protection in 1888, Sarawak in 1890. The British protectorate over Atjeh in Sumatra was relinquished to the Dutch in 1872.

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passed from Spain to the United States of America by the Spanish-American war of 1898, and at the same time the residue of the Spanish empire in the Pacific, consisting of the Pelew, Marianne and Caroline island groups in the ocean to the east of the Philippines, was ceded by Spain to Germany, to be taken from Germany by Japan in the war of 1914-18.

To the north of Malaya and Indonesia there were up to 1841 no European possessions except for the Portuguese leasehold of Macao and the Russian territory in the extreme north of the continent. The extent of the latter was defined by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first treaty ever signed by China with a European power, which was concluded in 1689. The Russians, whose empire in Asia had been founded by Yermak's capture of Sibir in 1581, had reached the Pacific coast at Okhotsk in 1647 and Lake Baikal in 1651; then they came into conflict with the Manchu-Chinese empire which controlled the basin of the Amur, and received a severe check. The Treaty of Nerchinsk fixed the Russo-Chinese border along the Stanovoi mountain range and the Uda river, leaving both banks of the Amur to China; this territorial settlement was not altered until 1858.

The Russian west-to-east advance through the far north of Asia did little to disturb the established order of things in the Far East during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for it went on in a back-world of primitive tribes—Buryats, Yakuts and Tungus—beyond the ken of high politics. It meant, however, that for the first time in history there was a power in the North-land which was not founded on nomadism, and with the first settlements of Russian peasants east of the Yenisei a new nation came into being there.

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The great European drive against China began with the Anglo-Chinese war of 1839 and it led to acquisitions in two categories: colonial and semi-colonial. The former kind, territorial gains in full sovereignty, included—

(1) Hongkong: the island ceded to Britain by China in 1841, Kowloon on the mainland added in 1860.

(2) French Indo-China: first annexations in 1862 in Cochinchina, protectorate over Cambodia in 1863, protectorate over Annam and Tongking (previously under Chinese suzerainty) recognized by China after Franco-Chinese war in 1885, Lao territory taken from Siam in 1893.

✓(3) Russian Far Eastern provinces: all country north of the Amur ceded by China to Russia in 1858, territory east of Usuri down to Korean border (including site of the future Vladivostok) ceded in 1860.


Besides these territories passing under European rule in full sovereignty, China was forced in 1898 to cede the following five districts under leasehold tenure, the occupying powers having complete rights of jurisdiction and military or naval use—

(1) Kiaochow: leased to Germany for 99 years, captured by Japanese 1914, restored to China 1922.

(2) Kwantung (Port Arthur and Dalny, now Ryojun and Dairen): renewable 25 years' lease to Russia, transferred to Japan by Treaty of Portsmouth 1905, lease prolonged to 99 years after ultimatum to China 1915.

(3) Weihaiwei: leased to Britain for 'as long as Russia shall remain in occupation of Port Arthur', restored to China 1930.

(4) Hongkong New Territory, consisting of 'all the land re-



- | | | |
|------------|---|-------|
| 1 Kobe | } | Japan |
| 2 Yokohama | | |
| 3 Osaka | | |
| 4 Moji | | |
| 5 Dairen | | |
| 6 Tientsin | } | China |
| 7 Tsingtao | | |
| 8 Shanghai | | |
| 9 Amoy | | |
| 10 Canton | | |
| 11 Swatow | | |

- | | | |
|------------------------|---|------------------|
| 12 Hongkong | } | British Colonies |
| 13 Singapore | | |
| 14 Haiphong | } | French Colonies |
| 15 Saigon | | |
| 16 Batavia | } | Dutch Colonies |
| 17 Semarang | | |
| 18 Soerabaya | | |
| 19 Bangkok, Siam | | |
| 20 Manila, Philippines | | |

Minimum shown: 1,000,000 tons of overseas traffic. Vladivostok (V), Sovetskaya (S), Nikolaevsk (N) and Rashin (R) fall short of this minimum, but are shown as a matter of interest.

6. PORTS OF THE FAR EAST

THE WESTERNERS

quired for the military defence of Hongkong': leased to Britain for 99 years.

(5) Kwangchow: leased to France for 99 years.

The leased territories were, and are, to all intents and purposes the colonial possessions of the states holding them. There is, however, another category of foreign treaty or customary rights in China which are definitely encroachments on Chinese sovereignty without conferring a generalized territorial control; these include the autonomous foreign 'concessions' and settlements, the foreign gunboats on inland waters, the Legation guards at Peiping and garrisons in the Peiping-Tientsin area, and the old railway zone system in Manchuria.

The foreign settlement system is closely bound up with the extra-territorial rights which the Western powers, beginning with Britain, acquired for their nationals by treaty. The Westerners in the ports were under the jurisdiction of their own consuls, lived in quarters of their own near their consulates and had their own police. In the long period of disorder and anti-foreign outbreaks in China they successfully asserted their claim to exclude Chinese police and soldiers from the settlements and to have their own armed forces—local volunteers or marines from their countries' warships. Originally suburban quarters, the settlements became in some cases—in particular at Shanghai and Tientsin—the principal business areas of their towns and drew in a Chinese population outnumbering the foreign residents. The growth of these autonomous un-national units—states within a state—provided a grave problem for the time when China should begin to organize a modern-style state administration, claiming in full the normal rights of sovereignty within her borders.

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The patrolling of the Yangtse by foreign gunboats was instituted in connection with the foreign settlements up the river and the foreign-owned river shipping. The practice was a fertile source of incidents, the most notable of which was the battle fought by H.M.S. *Cockchafer* in 1926 with forces of the provincial army of Szechwan at Wanhsien more than a thousand miles from the sea.

The stationing of foreign detachments for the protection of the Legations in Peiping and the guarding of the railway to Tientsin was authorized by the treaty of 1901, which settled accounts for the 'Boxer' anti-foreign outbreak of the previous year. The garrisons were meant to provide against renewed surprise attacks by anti-foreign bands, but, having once been established, they became a permanent institution, and the relevant clauses of the treaty have never yet been abrogated.

The railway zone system in Manchuria was introduced by the Russians, whose contract for the building of the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1896 gave the company (actually controlled by the Russian government) 'absolute and exclusive right of administration of its lands' with its own police force. Owing to the prevalence of brigandage in Manchuria soldiers were brought in to serve as police, so that the railway became in effect a ribbon of Russian territory across Manchuria. The same rights were obtained by Russia in 1898 for the branch from Harbin to Port Arthur, a section of which was transferred to Japan in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese war and became the South Manchuria Railway; by the Treaty of Portsmouth the railway guards were limited to 15 per kilometre, but this was quite sufficient for a considerable force to be assembled anywhere along the line.

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The semi-colonial servitudes on Chinese sovereignty were the result of China's failure to modernize her administrative and fiscal system during the second half of the nineteenth century. China retained enough strength and unity to survive as an independent state, but remained too weak and loosely organized either to give due protection to foreigners and their enterprises (which the official class in any case detested and had accepted only under *force majeure*) or to resist demands which were put to it on pretext of the disorderly conditions. The outcome of the long series of conflicts between the Western powers and the decaying Manchu-Chinese imperial régime was a compromise which made China a unique anomaly in international law, for, while continuing to hold rank as a sovereign state, she was deprived of the essential attributes of sovereignty inside her recognized frontiers. With foreign garrisons quartered in her territory and two alien-ruled municipalities in the heart of her biggest city, China was not, even after the Washington Conference of 1922, in possession of full sovereign rights. Chinese nationalism was inevitably imbued with a resolve to get rid of the 'unequal treaties', but strong vested interests had come to be bound up with them, and the position was all the more difficult because certain of the privileges claimed by foreigners had long been conceded in practice without any real treaty basis.

Japan escaped from the servitudes imposed upon China by her rapid self-modernization after 1868. She was in the beginning subjected, like China, to a system of extra-territoriality, and in the period of her internal troubles in the sixties was widely expected to fall to pieces and be eaten up by Western imperialism much more easily than China. But, having equipped herself with an effectively centralized administration, a Western-model

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legal code and a competent army and navy, Japan avoided the régime of foreign garrisons and independent settlements, and secured the final abolition of extra-territoriality in 1901. Nor did she stop at her own emancipation; even before it was complete, she had joined the Western powers as a holder of extra-territorial rights on the mainland of Asia. The possession of such rights came to appear to the Japanese, from their own experience on the wrong side of it, to be the distinctive attribute of civilized states in relation to backward peoples, and its economic value was also appreciated. In Korea Japan was actually first in the field and secured a trade treaty with extra-territorial rights for her nationals in advance of any other nation. She obtained the same privileges in China by the Treaty of Shimonoseki after the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, and thus entered the ranks of the Western powers who already held them. Under the Boxer Protocol of 1901 she shared with the Western powers the right of keeping garrisons in the Peiping-Tientsin area. By the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 she took over part of the system of rights previously extorted by the Russians in Manchuria, including the Kwantung Leased Territory and the railway as far as Changchun with its privileges of administration and railway guards. In this way Japan gained a foothold inside China, and in the end the Western powers discovered that she was the principal beneficiary of a system they had originally elaborated for their own advantage.


Chapter IV

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

The Chinese empire, as constituted in the first decade of the present century, consisted of the eighteen provinces of China Proper and the four outer dependencies, Manchuria, Mongolia, Sinkiang or East Turkestan, and Tibet. China Proper comprised only 1,533,000 out of a total area of 4,278,000 square miles, but was estimated to contain well over 95 per cent of the total population.

This great empire was the creation of the Manchus, who captured Peking¹ in 1644 and set up the Ch'ing dynasty in China. The purely Chinese Ming dynasty, which had reigned from 1368 to 1644, had not held sway over north-west Manchuria, Mongolia, western Sinkiang or Tibet, though its territory in the time of its full vigour had extended north-westward by the Kansu corridor to Hami and north-eastward to the lower Amur and the Japan Sea north of Korea. Towards the end of the Ming period the Chinese were confined within the Great Wall, while the Northland passed under the domination of two barbaric powers: the Kalmuks and the Manchus. The former, whose homeland was

¹ Now Peiping. Peking means 'Northern Capital', and when it ceased to be the capital in 1928, its early name of Peiping was officially restored.



 Ming Dynasty
1415 A.D.

 Boundaries of
Manchu Empire
1912

1697 Year of
Acquisition
(by Manchus)

1895 Year of
Loss

7. CHINA UNDER THE MING AND MANCHU DYNASTIES

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

in western Mongolia, were essentially nomadic; the latter, whose ascendancy was based on east-central Manchuria, combined shifting cultivation and horse-breeding with hunting in their economy, and were better able to amalgamate with the Chinese than the pure nomads. They conquered Liaoning province (Mukden and Dairen) before they penetrated into China Proper, and were affected culturally by the long-established Chinese population in southern Manchuria; at the same time they drew into their confederacy a number of Mongol tribes who aided them in their wars against China.¹ The Manchus entered China in 1644 to take part in a Chinese civil war and at once took possession of the capital (Peking), though the south was not fully subdued for a generation. Then, towards the end of the seventeenth century the Manchus, strengthened by the resources of China, where their power was now centred, turned their arms against the Kalmuks and in a series of campaigns incorporated the whole of Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang in their empire.

Outside the limits of Manchu-Chinese rule there were several states which could not be regarded as forming part of the empire, but were attached to it by formal acknowledgment of suzerainty and the payment of tribute. This category of countries included Korea, Luchu (Ryukyu in Japanese, the string of Japanese-inhabited small islands between Kyushu and Formosa), Annam, Burma and Nepal. Such relations of states were not recognized in Western international law based on the theory of sovereignty, and in the nineteenth century China was required either to accept responsibility for the acts of her 'vassals'—which

¹ Each of the Eight Banners (*pa ch'i*) of the Manchu army contained three sections—Manchu, Mongol and Chinese.

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

she generally declined to do—or to disinterest herself in their fate. In the end Korea and Luchu were annexed by Japan, Annam by France, Burma by Britain, and Nepal, which retained a semi-independence inside the framework of British Indian paramountcy, ceased to pay tribute after the Chinese Revolution of 1911.

Within the internationally recognized borders of the Manchu empire the Manchu element gradually declined in importance and was swallowed up by the Chinese population. The state was always known to Europeans as 'China' or the 'Chinese empire', and Chinese was its official language.¹ The process of assimilation, moreover, was not limited to China Proper, but extended also, and in an even greater degree, to the Manchu homeland. The Manchu tribesmen, a warlike but never numerous community, were distributed in garrisons over the empire, and Manchuria itself was left almost empty; the Manchu emperors, wishing to preserve it as an exclusive domain of their race, at first prohibited the immigration of Chinese, but the prohibition was later on relaxed, and in the late nineteenth century Chinese settlement was positively encouraged in order to create a human barrier against the flow of Russian colonization east of Lake Baikal. Manchuria thus became almost purely Chinese, except for the arid western tracts which were left to Mongol nomads, and the Manchus virtually disappeared as a distinct nationality with a territory of their own; formally, however, the administration of Manchuria, 'the three eastern provinces' (*tung san shêng*), was kept separate from that of China Proper, 'the eighteen provinces' (*shih pa shêng*), until 1907.

¹ In the eighteenth century, however, official business between China and Russia was transacted in Manchu, and Manchu grammars and dictionaries were compiled by Russians.

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

The order established by the Manchu empire also led to an extension of Chinese settlement in two other regions beyond the Great Wall: Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. In the former Chinese peasants encroached on cultivable steppe land at the expense of the Mongols' pastures, the government officials and Mongol princes finding profit for themselves in the process. In Sinkiang the settlement was more a matter of policy; colonies of Chinese and Manchus were planted, especially in the Kulja and Urumchi districts, to protect the western march of the empire, at first against the still unsubdued Kalmuks and later against Russia. In Tibet and Outer Mongolia, on the other hand, there was no Chinese colonization, and Chinese nationality was represented only by a handful of officials and traders.

Within China Proper there was evident throughout the period of the Manchu dynasty a deep cleavage between north and south in relation to the central government at Peking. In the words of a writer on Chinese history:¹ 'The Manchus occupied northern China by consent, unopposed; they conquered the south by force after a long and bitter struggle. This fact dominated the later history of the dynasty, and still to-day explains the differing attitude of the northern and southern Chinese towards the Manchu dynasty and the imperial system.'

The hostility of the south towards the Manchu régime was further accentuated by the penetration of Western cultural influences into the south in advance of their extension to the north, contacts with foreigners being made not only through the ports open to foreign trade—of which Shanghai was the most northerly from 1842 to 1858—but also through Chinese emigration, which came mainly from Kwangtung to Malaya, the Dutch

¹ C. P. Fitzgerald, *China: a Short Cultural History*, p. 535.

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

East Indies and America. The great T'ai P'ing rebellion, which broke out in 1851, was not only anti-Manchu, but also Christian; it began in Kwangsi, and its advance, first to Hankow and then down the Yangtse to Nanking, foreshadowed the later progress of the Kuomintang forces from Canton to the North China Plain. The T'ai P'ing rebellion was finally suppressed in 1864, but the cleavage between north and south was not overcome, and Canton subsequently became the focus of the revolutionary, modernizing, nationalist movement in China.¹

The T'ai P'ing rebels sought to supplant the Manchu dynasty, not to break up the unity of the empire; the Moslem rebellions which occurred during the same period threatened, however, the disruption of Chinese sovereignty. Independent kingdoms, which made appeals for British protection, were set up in Sinkiang and Yunnan, and the Russians took the opportunity to occupy Kulja and the Ili basin in 1871. But the Chinese in the end crushed the Moslem revolts and recovered Kulja by negotiation. The empire within the frontiers of 1860 was thus preserved intact until the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 brought Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria into peril.

The war was fought on the issue of Chinese suzerainty over Korea, but military operations were also carried into southern Manchuria, and by the Treaty of Shimonoseki the Liaotung peninsula, including Port Arthur, was ceded to Japan. Russia, however, persuaded France and Germany to join her in compelling Japan by an ultimatum to restore this territory to China, and then took advantage of her position as China's protector to penetrate Manchuria herself. In 1898 she compelled China to

¹ The Cantonese did not support the T'ai P'ing movement, whose leader belonged to the distinct Hakka community of Kwangtung Chinese.

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

grant her a lease of Port Arthur, which she proceeded to turn into a fortress and naval base; this stronghold together with the Russian-controlled railways gave the Russians paramount influence in Manchuria, and when in 1900 the Boxer anti-foreign outbreak was made the excuse for a general military occupation, the country passed completely under Russian dominion. The Russian rule was not destined to last long, for in 1904 Japan, covered against French or German intervention by the Anglo-Japanese alliance, made war on Russia and expelled her forces from Port Arthur and Mukden. This did not, however, result in a full restoration of Chinese sovereign control in Manchuria, for, though the Treaty of Portsmouth required a withdrawal of all troops, Russian or Japanese, outside the Kwantung Leased Territory (Port Arthur) and the railway zones, these corridors of foreign power remained, only they were now shared between Russia and Japan. Nor could China count after 1907 on the mutual hostility of Russia and Japan, for, having fought each other, they soon entered into close political collaboration, and by private arrangement between themselves partitioned all Chinese territory north of the Great Wall into 'spheres of influence'—Russia to have North Manchuria, Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang, while Japan reserved to herself South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

The Russian empire-building in Manchuria from 1896 to 1904 was supplemented by Russian intrigues in Tibet, which brought about British intervention and a military expedition to Lhasa in 1904, Chinese control of Tibet being at that time very slight. To reassert the authority of Peking a Chinese army was sent to Tibet in 1908 and had just succeeded in its task when the Chinese Revolution broke out in 1911.



8. PROVINCES OF CHINA IN THE LAST TEN YEARS

MANCHU EMPIRE AND CHINESE REPUBLIC

After the fall of the Manchu dynasty the Chinese Republic was recognized internationally as inheriting all the territories of the old empire, but both the Tibetans and the Mongols of Outer Mongolia repudiated the Republic and took advantage of the confusion to gain *de facto* independence. The Republic adopted a flag with five bars to represent the five nationalities which were to form the new state—Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans, but the driving force in the new movement was pure Chinese nationalism, and it evoked strong resistance from the two most coherent of the non-Chinese nationalities of the empire—the Tibetans and the Mongols. Of the other two the Manchus, as already stated, had ceased to form a real nationality, while among the Moslems the great majority were Chinese-speaking (Tungans) and, with the modern nationalist stress on language rather than religion as the criterion of allegiance, tended to regard themselves primarily as Chinese in the new era; the Turki Moslems of Sinkiang were not strong enough by themselves to form an independent state.

A feature of the Republican régime has been the creation of new provinces assimilated to the administrative system of China Proper in those nearer parts of Tibet and Mongolia which remained under Chinese control. Sikang and Tsinghai were carved out of eastern Tibet, while Inner Mongolia was split up into the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyüan and Ninghsia.

Apart from the Tibetan and Mongol secessions, however, there was a great disintegration of the Chinese state after 1915. The military governors of provinces engrossed the provincial revenues and made war on one another with private armies in the manner of feudal barons. Their insubordination was supported to some extent by the traditional particularism of

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Chinese provinces and their reluctance to submit to a centralized fiscal system, but in no case was there a real separatist movement aimed at setting up a new sovereign state. Among educated Chinese the consciousness of nationality was continually growing stronger, and the Kuomintang party with its headquarters at Canton was building up a powerful nationalist movement with a programme of 'rights recovery', 'abolition of unequal treaties', state unification and economic self-development. Nevertheless, as long as the regional *tuchün* despotisms and civil wars continued, China was even weaker in relation to foreign powers than she had been under the Manchus, and her economic evolution was held up; the country's substance was devoured by unproductive spoliation and brigandage, and foreign capital did not dare to venture in under conditions of such disorder except where it was assured of political control.

At the Washington Conference in 1922 eight nations agreed with China in the so-called Nine-Power Treaty to 'provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government'. Such a prospect corresponded on the whole to the policies of Britain and the U.S.A., who took the lead at the Conference; a third signatory, however, was by no means of one mind with regard to the desirability of assisting the growth of a strong, united China. Influential official and business circles in Japan believed that their country had a vested interest in Chinese disunion, and that the unification and industrialization of China would spell Japan's political and economic decline. In particular they feared that a nationalist Chinese central government controlling Manchuria would soon make an end of the existing monopoly position of the South Manchuria Railway.

Chapter V

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

In 1853, when Commodore Perry demanded the opening of Japan to foreign trade, Japan was almost completely secluded from the outer world and her dominion was confined to the four large islands from Kyushu to Yezo (Hokkaido).¹ She had no foothold on the mainland of Asia. To the south-west of Kyushu, the Ryukyu islands, which are now an integral part of Japan, then formed a separate kingdom which paid tribute to China, though also recognizing a certain suzerainty of the Japanese lords of Satsuma in Kyushu. To the north of Yezo Japanese fishermen and petty traders frequented the shores of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, but there was no Japanese administration. Yezo itself was scarcely Japanese except in the extreme south; most of it was wild forest country still left to the primitive Aino aborigines. Japan in effect consisted of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and the closely adjacent small islands.

Under the seclusionist system established early in the seventeenth century Japanese subjects were not allowed to go abroad, for trade or any other purpose, on pain of death if they returned; foreigners were not allowed in Japan except for a very limited

¹ Hokkaido is really the name for an administrative division including Yezo and the Kuriles, but it has come to be used as a synonym for Yezo by itself.

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trade, open only to the Chinese and Dutch, in the port of Nagasaki. From 1615 to 1853 Japan had no foreign war and no serious internal revolt; this period affords the most striking contrast to the stormy history of modern Japan.

Since prehistoric times (before A.D. 200) Japan has never been successfully invaded. The attempts made by Kublai Khan, the Mongol emperor of China, in the thirteenth century resulted in complete disaster, and the failure of what was then the strongest power in Asia to subdue the islands of the 'Yamato race' gave the Japanese a traditional confidence in the divinely assured inviolability of their country. The Kublai Khan invasion has the same place in Japanese, as the Spanish Armada in English, memory; the inscription 'He blew with His winds and they were scattered' on the pedestal of Drake's monument at Plymouth affords an exact counterpart to 'the divine wind of Ise', the typhoon which wrecked the fleet of China's overlord. This tradition of security goes far to explain the remarkable vigour of the national awakening when the Japanese in the eighteenth-fifties suddenly found their coasts and ports at the mercy of foreign warships.

Prior to the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 the Japanese had twice in their history made temporary conquests on the Asiatic mainland. At an uncertain date sometime before A.D. 400 they penetrated into Korea, that country being at the time divided into several small kingdoms; in 663 they were finally expelled by an alliance of the Korean kingdom of Shinra with China, and Korea was united by Shinra under Chinese suzerainty. From 663 to 1592 there was no Japanese intervention in continental affairs, though the coasts of Kyushu were a base for corsairs who sorely harried the peoples of the mainland; then the great soldier

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Hideyoshi, having united Japan under his own rule (formally subject to the authority of the Mikado) after a long period of civil wars, designed the conquest of China and invaded Korea as a preliminary. After a campaign of varying fortunes the troops were withdrawn on the death of Hideyoshi in 1598, and the war came to be known as the *Ryo-to Ja-bi* or 'Dragon's head and snake's tail' because of its glorious beginning and inglorious ending. From 1598 no further attempt at continental expansion was made until after the 'westernization' of Japan.

With the entry of Japan into a world of international relations and modern navies the possession of outlying islands came to be of great importance, and it was to these that Japan's attention was first directed after the 'Restoration' of 1868. In 1875 a treaty was made with Russia whereby Russia acquired sovereignty over Sakhalin and Japan over the Kuriles (Chishima). The Bonin islands (Ogasawarajima) to the south-east of Japan were formally annexed in 1876, and the Ryukyu islands (with a Japanese-speaking population) in 1879, China's claim to suzerainty over the latter being ignored.¹ The Kuriles, the Bonins and Ryukyu were incorporated in the administrative system of Japan Proper and are not to-day counted as colonial territories.

The acquisition of a definitely colonial domain began with the annexation of Taiwan (Formosa), which was ceded by China after the war of 1894-5. The Liaotung peninsula of southern Manchuria, which had been occupied by the Japanese army during the war, was also ceded by the same peace treaty, but was restored to China after the ultimatum known as the Triple Intervention, in which Russia, France and Germany partici-

¹ The former king of Ryukyu was given a title in the Japanese peerage.



9. THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF JAPAN

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pated. During the next few years it seemed likely that Russia would swallow up both Manchuria and Korea and exclude Japan from any possibility of expansion on the mainland, but the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 turned the tables and left Japanese forces in control of Korea, southern Manchuria and most of the island of Sakhalin. By the Treaty of Portsmouth, which concluded the war, Russia ceded to Japan half of Sakhalin and the leasehold of Port Arthur and Dalny (Kwantung), which she had acquired from China; Korea, nominally a sovereign state since 1895, was placed under a thinly disguised Japanese protectorate and was finally annexed in 1910. At the time of the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 Japan thus held four colonial territories: Taiwan, Chosen (Korea), Karafuto (southern Sakhalin) and Kwantung, and as a result of the Great War she obtained a fifth—the island groups in the Pacific north of the Equator which had belonged to Germany. Of the five, three—Taiwan, Chosen and Karafuto—were under Japan's full sovereignty; in the other two her sovereignty was qualified, Kwantung being held on lease from China, and the ex-German islands under a mandate of the League of Nations.

The conquests made by Japanese armies in Manchuria, Mongolia and China since 1931 have effected no formal addition to the Japanese empire, for a method of 'indirect rule' has been applied without any annexation or even protectorate of the ordinary kind; Manchukuo is in Japanese theory a sovereign state, and any nation which so desires can have diplomatic representation at Hsinking—at the price of recognizing Manchukuo's sovereignty and detachment from China. The world in general does not take this theory very seriously and regards Manchukuo as merely an alias for Japan. But in keeping up the

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elaborate hocus-pocus of independence for a country she in reality controls Japan is simply following an example set by Britain with the concurrence of the League of Nations, for the admission of India in 1919 to a society whose membership is by its constitution restricted to independent states and 'fully self-governing' colonies or dominions introduced into international relations an element of sheer humbug which the world will yet have cause to regret. If a state can be recognized as 'fully self-governing' when it lacks every attribute of real independence, the way is open for an unlimited faking of sovereignty. By virtue of the Geneva conception of national independence Japan can at least claim that the people of Manchuria have not enjoyed less freedom in setting up the government of Manchukuo than has the 'fully self-governing' Indian nation in choosing Lord Linlithgow as its ruler.


In effect the Japanese empire at the time of writing extends to Paotou on the Yellow River and Kiukiang on the Yangtse, and its limits are the fronts of the Japanese armies in the field. The populations under Japanese rule outside Japan already outnumber the conquering nation, whereas up to 1931 the inhabitants of the colonies were in a ratio of only about 3:7 to those of the homeland.

Japan Proper has an area of 147,611 square miles (slightly larger than Great Britain, but smaller than any one of thirteen out of the eighteen provinces of China Proper) and a population of over 70 million. The Japanese in their islands form a very well-defined and compact nationality, and except for the negligible remnant of the Aino aborigines in Hokkaido (now only 20,000 strong) Japan has no domestic nationality problem. It should be remembered, however, in relation to internal politics that,

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although Japan is a small country inhabited by a single nationality, its surface is so much intersected by mountains as well as by the insular divisions that a very strong local particularism prevails, and 'county town' influences are an effective counterweight to the political activity of the big cities. London is not Britain and Paris is not France; it is even more true that Tokyo is not Japan, in spite of a centralized unitary system of administration. Up to seventy years ago Japan was divided into small feudal units, many of which were very loosely attached to the central power, and the old loyalties persist, so that Japanese opinion is formed no less in such places as Kagoshima, Saga and Kanazawa than in the capital, and the cliques in national politics often have narrowly local roots. The strong district attachments provide a framework for the separate life of rural Japan, industry being concentrated in a few restricted areas in the south-east of Honshu and the extreme north of Kyushu. The army in Japan specially represents the countryside, for most of the officers come from the small landowning gentry and the conscripts are selected as far as possible from peasant stock rather than from the town population.

The directly ruled colonies have a total population of about 30 million, of which less than 2 million are Japanese, the remainder being made up of about 22 million Koreans, 6 million Chinese in Formosa and Kwantung, and one to two hundred thousand Formosa aborigines and natives of the Mandated Islands. To this total must now be added, as for the time being subject to Japan, over 30 millions in Manchukuo and approximately 100 millions (minus refugees) in the areas occupied by Japan in China Proper since the outbreak of hostilities last year; all these are Chinese except for some




10. MINERALS IN JAPAN AND KOREA

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three million Mongols in the west of Manchukuo and in Inner Mongolia.



The history of Japan's expansion falls into two periods corresponding to the distinction between her formal and her informal empire. The colonial territories acquired up to 1931 were all of some value, but they did not give Japan in the long run a strong economic position either for commercial competition in a world of increasing economic nationalism or for war-power under conditions of strategy in which military decision was tending more and more to depend on capacity for avoiding economic breakdown in time of war. Japan and Korea were more or less self-sufficing as regards foodstuffs, and Formosa on the edge of the tropics supplemented their resources with sugar, citrus fruits and other special products. In minerals, however, and in the raw materials of several of her most important industries Japan remained largely or entirely dependent on imports for essential supplies. Japan is not rich in any important mineral except copper; her resources of coal are small, of iron ore insignificant, and of oil negligible, for a country which aims at large-scale industrial development. Good coking coal is conspicuous by its absence. For textile industries cotton must be entirely, and wool almost entirely, imported; the rayon industry is also partly dependent on wood-pulp imports.

To create big industries and support a large population by the export of manufactured goods with so inadequate a basis of natural resources would be a formidable task even in a world of free trade, stable currencies and general political harmony. Under the conditions prevailing in the world since 1919, and still more since 1930, industrialization has involved Japan in very serious difficulties, and the most disconcerting factor in the



JAPAN:

TRADE 1936




II. JAPANESE TRADE 1936

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situation has been the prospect of the competitive industrialization of China. For China not only has five times the population of Japan, but is far better endowed with natural resources and capacity for raw-material production, especially as regards coal, iron and cotton. If China and Japan had begun their self-modernization simultaneously about 1870 and had continued at the same rate, there can be no doubt but that China would now be the Great Power of the Far East, both economically and politically, and that Japan would still be a mainly agricultural country and a power of secondary rank, comparing with China in much the same way as Holland or Sweden with Britain or Germany. But China's late start gave Japan a long lead both in economic development and military power, and to retain this lead has been the main preoccupation of Japanese policy for the last decade.

If a united and efficiently administered China were to carry through a programme of industrialization with her advantages of abundant cheap labour equal to Japan's and with superior natural resources, she would quickly surpass Japan both in heavy and light industries, competing ruinously with Japanese trade both in the Chinese home market (covered by tariffs if necessary) and elsewhere, and also reducing Japan to inferiority in power by a greater and more self-sufficient capacity for war-material production. Even if Japan were prepared to contemplate such an economic and political abdication, adjustment would be extremely difficult with a momentum of population increase adapted to an expanding economic system, and the strain on the social structure would probably lead to domestic revolution. Hence the 'positive' policy towards China, which means, in short, to keep China weak and divided, to prevent a



12. JAPANESE TRADE EXPANSION

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Kuomintang-directed, anti-Japanese industrialization of China, and to control the raw material resources of the country for Japan's own use in peace or war.

Japanese liberals during the nineteen-twenties believed that a satisfactory compromise was possible, and they might have reached an understanding with the new China but for the fundamental conflict over Japan's vested interests in South Manchuria—interests which were based on the political supremacy taken over from Russia in 1905 and were regarded by Chinese nationalists as incompatible with China's sovereignty. The conflict reached a climax in 1931, at a time when Japan was in the throes of a serious internal crisis due to the effects of a world-wide economic depression, and the army chiefs took the opportunity to launch Japan on a new era of imperialist expansion. The military occupation of Manchuria not only secured the vested interests of the South Manchuria Railway but delivered all the resources of four Chinese provinces into the hands of Japan. Some Japanese leaders hoped to close the account with the completion of this conquest. There could, however, be no stopping at the borders of Manchuria. China now became implacably hostile and acquired a new political unity and energy from the principle of 'anti-Japanism'; her capacity for economic development was not seriously impaired by the loss of Manchuria, for her most important economic areas lay south of the Great Wall. In 1935 China reformed her currency with British financial support and advice, and at the beginning of 1937, as a result of the Sian kidnapping incident, the civil war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists was brought to an end and replaced by an anti-Japanese People's Front. Meanwhile the tariff and quota restrictions on Japanese export

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trade and exchange difficulties due to inflationary finance had combined to convert Japanese business circles to a programme of obtaining economic control over the raw-material resources of North China; the fighting services favoured the same policy as a means of both forestalling the growth of China's war-power and strengthening their own. In these circumstances, after four years of uneasy truce, the war against China was renewed at the end of July 1937.

Chapter VI

SOVIET SIBERIA

The territories of the Soviet Union stretch to the north-west, north and north-east of both China and Japan—Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka is nearly 20 degrees of longitude east of Tokyo—and in Far Eastern politics the Russian power established between Lake Baikal and the Pacific stands at the apex of the triangle of which China and Japan form the base. The obvious strategic importance of East Siberia, however, and its vast size on the map do not at all correspond to its significance in the economy of the Soviet Union. It is by far the poorest both actually and potentially (on known data) of the main regions of the Union, and if all territory east of the Yenisei were to be eliminated to-morrow, the Soviet economic system would hardly be affected by the loss, except perhaps as regards gold-mining and the fur trade.

The economic power of the Soviet Union and its future prospects in world affairs are based on its enormous natural resources in soil and minerals. The great belt of *chernozym* or 'black earth' soil from the Dniester to the Yenisei provides the possibility of an abundant agricultural production, while enormous reserves of coal and iron ore in European Russia and West Siberia afford an adequate foundation for a heavy industry on

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the largest scale. Add to these assets the oil of the Caucasus, the copper and cotton of Turkestan, the timber of the north, the broad cattle and sheep pastures of the steppe margins and the fact that Russia is all plain, except for the Urals, from the Baltic to the Altai, and the whole of that area is seen to form a grand economic unit of prodigious natural wealth. But East Siberia falls outside that area and forms a separate region in no way comparable in natural resources. It has virtually no black-earth soil and very little cultivable land; it is in great part as mountainous as it is barren; except for gold, deposits of which are found mainly in the Lena basin, it has no mineral wealth remotely comparable to that of European Russia or West Siberia; communications are inadequate for such resources as there are and can only be developed at great expense.¹ The principal maritime outlet, Vladivostock, does not find a place in the first rank of Far Eastern ports in respect of tonnage cleared. In a process of normal economic development East Siberia would remain a region of 'bad lands' like northern Canada, productive of gold and furs with a supplement of lumber and fisheries, but a mere appendage to the main economy of the Soviet Union. Its recent development, under the direction of central government planning, has been highly artificial and dominated by strategic-political considerations, which require the existence of an agricultural and coal-metal base to support Soviet military power in the Far East.

In 1931 the population of East Siberia, including considerable territory to the west of the Yenisei, was as follows:

Far Eastern Region (of R.S.F.S.R.)	-	-	1,593,400
Yakutsk Republic	-	-	308,400


¹ Gold and furs from Yakutia are at present transported mainly by air.

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Buryat-Mongol Republic	-	-	-	575,000
East Siberian Region (of R.S.F.S.R.)	-	-	-	<u>2,568,400</u>
<i>Total</i>	-	-	-	5,045,200

A population of rather over 5 millions in this vast area—and it has not greatly increased since 1931—is little enough in comparison with over 400 millions in China and nearly 100 millions in Japan and Korea. Moreover, it has not been attained without great efforts to promote colonization, begun by the Tsarist government after the Russo-Japanese war, when the emptiness of East Siberia was revealed as a great handicap on the Russian army operating in Manchuria. Soviet policy has sought to induce settlers to come east of Lake Baikal—and stay there—by drastic exemptions from taxation; another device has been the founding of the autonomous area of Biro-Bijan as a colony for Jews in the country north of the Amur. Labour for road and railway construction has been supplied in recent years by convicts, who were available in large quantities after the liquidation of the kulaks under the First Five-Year Plan. By special inducements to some and coercion for others the Soviet government has during the last decade assembled in East Siberia a greater number of Russians than would otherwise have gone there, but the total effect on the wilderness has not been very great, and the Soviet Far Eastern army still relies less on local agriculture and industries than on its magazines and its railway communications with the west.

The Trans-Siberian railway has lately been double-tracked and this has vastly increased its efficiency as a route of supply. Now that the Manchurian section of the direct Chita-Vladivostok line (the old Chinese Eastern Railway) has been sold to



Coal (main basins)

Oil refinery
Oil
Iron

Gold
Lead, zinc, etc.
Principal metallurgical centres

Gold industry
Wood industry
Cellulose and paper industry
Electric power station

Ship-building centres
Agricultural machine building
Sea route from Leningrad
Murmansk
Archangel

Towns of the principal industrial areas are underlined

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Manchukuo and would be held by Japan in case of war, the only line to Vladivostok is that by Khabarovsk, going to the north of the Amur. This railway keeps well behind the frontier, but it might be cut by a rapid offensive from Manchukuo, or the Trans-Siberian might be cut to the south of Lake Baikal by a Japanese advance through Outer Mongolia; in either event, East Siberia has now a second line of defence based on a railway to the north of Lake Baikal, which has been under construction during the last three years. The terminus of this line is the new town of Sovietskaya on the coast north of Vladivostok.

In spite of the general indigence of East Siberia, it has two assets which are of considerable significance for Japan's economic system. Marine products play an exceptionally large part in Japanese food consumption and some of the best fishing grounds within convenient range of Japan are inside, or just outside, Russian territorial waters in the Gulf of Tartary and off the west coast of Kamchatka. The Russians make comparatively little use of these fisheries and their exploitation by Japanese fishing fleets has long been a source of friction, acrimonious discussion and hard bargaining between the two governments. The second bone of contention has been the Sakhalin oilfield, which lies entirely in the northern, i.e. the Russian, half of the island. The oilfield was not known to exist in 1905, or the Japanese would not have agreed to the partition of Sakhalin as readily as they did in the settlement after the Russo-Japanese war. The oilfield is of little consequence to the country which possesses the wells of Baku and Grozni; it is, however, of major importance for the Far East, which is very poor in natural oil outside Indonesia, and especially for Japan, a country with only trivial oil resources of its own. Since 1925 a Japanese company has therefore

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worked the Sakhalin field with a concession on the checkerboard system, and the arrangement has been too profitable to both countries to be upset by the most violent political quarrels. If Japan were to be at war with Russia or Russia were to apply full economic sanctions against Japan, the supply would of course be cut off, and even if Japanese armed forces could seize the field, the wells could be put out of action for a long time by competent wrecking. On the other hand, it would be extremely difficult for Russia, with her lack of sea-power, to hold Sakhalin in a war, or to recover it if lost except by a knock-out victory elsewhere. The situation is therefore such as to deter both powers from going to extremes in this matter, and the operations of the Kita Karafuto Petroleum Company have been notable for their obscurity rather than for their prominence in world affairs, especially since the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese war.

It has been well said that the Soviet Far Eastern Region is worth having, but not worth a major war, and there is good reason to believe that this is the view of the Japanese army chiefs. There have been two occasions, however, within the last twenty years when it appeared for a while that the Russian Far East might be overrun without a major war. The first was at the time of the civil wars in Siberia just after the Russian Revolution. Japan then sent troops to Siberia along with British, French and American contingents as part of the Allied intervention on behalf of the Czechoslovak legionaries in 1918. As the intervention developed into support of the Russian counter-revolution, the Japanese evolved a policy designed to give them a protectorate over Transbaikalia and the Maritime Province; they backed, not the would-be central government of Admiral Kolchak, but

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the Cossack adventurers Semenov and Kalmikov who fought, each for his own hand, in East Siberia. The project failed, partly because of the solidarity of Russian national feeling against the Japanese and their protégés, partly because the Japanese military forces at that time lacked sufficient warm clothing to enable them to remain in the field during the Siberian winter in more than fifty degrees of frost. There was a lack of enthusiasm for the campaign in Japan, and the U.S.A. applied pressure for withdrawal. Finally, the Japanese evacuated Vladivostok in the autumn of 1922; they stayed in the Russian half of Sakhalin until 1925, and secured the oilfield concession already mentioned in consideration of their departure.

When the Russians started to develop Vladivostok as an air base, Japanese army leaders began to think the place had been too lightly given up, and another opportunity to lay hold on the Maritime Province seemed to offer itself in 1932. When the Kwantung army took the offensive in southern Manchuria in September 1931, the Soviet Union was just entering on the critical period of the First Five-Year Plan and was incapable of any vigorous action externally; the Japanese, therefore, in confidence of immunity from Russian intervention in Manchuria, followed up their initial drive in their own railway sphere with an advance across the zone of the Russian-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway and up to the Amur. They thus placed themselves astride the principal line of communication with Vladivostok, and a policy group in the army advocated the seizure of all Soviet territory south of the Amur by a rapid offensive while the going was good. However, the fighting which broke out at Shanghai early in 1932 not only diverted Japan's attention elsewhere, but brought her into a position of such diplomatic isolation that

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a further military adventure was out of the question. The military party therefore contented itself with the elimination of Soviet interests and influence from Manchuria, which was a solid achievement and greatly strengthened Japan's strategic position.

Since 1933 Russia's defensive strength in the Far East has been so much increased that an invasion of Siberia or surprise attack on Vladivostok has not been a practical proposition for Japan. Nevertheless there has been a state of high tension between Japan and Russia, and a succession of lively border incidents has fed the rumour of an impending war. The Communists have made it almost an article of faith that Japanese penetration of China is merely preparation for an attack on the Soviet Union. But for an economically motivated imperialism there is no sense in seeking to acquire a territory that is at once poverty-stricken and strongly defended when richer and weaker lands lie close within reach. The anti-Soviet agitation in the Japanese army appears to be due partly to ideological and partly to strategic considerations, and it also has a distinct value to the military party in its psychological effect on the Japanese public.

However far the Soviet state under Stalin may have departed from the principles of Lenin and the Old Bolsheviks, it continues to stand for republicanism, anti-feudalism and agrarian revolution, and is therefore anathema to the social class which the Japanese officers' corps mainly represents. In China Communism has compromised with landlords, but only in order to unite the Chinese nation in the cause of anti-Japanism. On all counts the Japanese emperor-revering, feudally minded 'double patriot' fears and detests communist Russia. But such a sentiment, though it is an important political factor, is not likely to drive

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Japan into war with Russia unless it coincides with the economic urge of Japanese expansion, and this urge is otherwise directed. There is even a group of business interests which advocates an understanding with the Soviet Union in order that Japan may concentrate on an anti-British policy; this group is not dominant, but its mere existence is very significant.

Strategically the Japanese military attitude is determined by fear of Russian intervention on behalf of China. The building of strategic railways and display of military strength towards the Soviet border are deterrent by intention; these measures are essentially defensive as regards Russia, though their purpose is to cover offensive strategy in China. Since the middle of last year some 400,000 Japanese troops have been held in Manchukuo to guard against any Russian move to render direct military aid to China, and though actual war has so far been avoided, the need for such a concentration has made the struggle with China far more difficult and costly than it would otherwise have been. Japan has had to fight in China with one arm while keeping the northern gate firmly shut with the other.

The strength of the Soviet Far Eastern army and the menace of the bombers at Vladivostok to the cities of Japan are genuine preoccupations of the Japanese General Staff. But the danger involves a compensating advantage, which would make a *rapprochement* with Russia something of a disaster for the military party. It is not possible to obtain strong popular support for an expansionist policy involving heavy sacrifices unless the people have a sense of being themselves threatened. The Vladivostok bombers are a threat to Japan's power, but they are an asset to Japanese militarism just because they put the country in danger. By frequent air-raid drills carried out with great realism in the

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larger cities the Japanese man-in-the-street is made conscious of the devastation that may come at any time from the other side of the Japan Sea and is more reconciled to the taxation he has to pay for the nation's swollen armaments and continental wars.

If war were to break out between Japan and Russia, there is no doubt but that Russian bombers from coastal bases on the Japan Sea could do serious damage in Japan. The distance from Vladivostok to Tsuruga is 490 miles (as compared with 386 miles, Hamburg to Hull) and Kyoto and Osaka are only a little farther on. Tokyo is less exposed, because bombers would have to fly over the mountains of Shinano or Kotsuke, where anti-aircraft batteries at high altitudes might be very troublesome. The vital centres of Japan are certainly vulnerable to air attack, whereas those of Russia are out of reach for Japan; on the other hand, it seems unlikely that the war could be decided by air action alone, and on the ground the remoteness of the real bases of Russian power would tell in favour of Japan in a struggle in which the Japanese stood on the defensive, especially if they were to evacuate the Amur salient and concentrate on holding Harbin with the Gobi desert covering Jehol and Chahar. Unless it were quickly decided by some remarkable military victory or by an internal convulsion in Japan, it appears probable that the emptiness and vast distances of East Siberia and Mongolia would make such a war more exhausting for Russia than for her enemy.

Chapter VII

MANCHUKUO

The territory of the state of Manchukuo, created by the agency of Japanese military power in 1932, comprises the former Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol. The first three of these were known to the Chinese as 'the Three Eastern Provinces' and made up the area known to foreigners as Manchuria; Jehol was reckoned a part of Inner Mongolia. All four, however, prior to the Japanese conquest were under the control of the military despotism established in the years following the Chinese revolution by the adventurer Chang Tso-lin and inherited in 1928 by his son Chang Hsüeh-liang.

Manchuria is geographically separated from China Proper by the inner gulf of the Yellow Sea and by the mountains which shut in the North China plain and extend to the coast at Shan-haikwán. The Great Wall follows the line of these mountains and was designed to keep the passes by which barbarian raiders from Manchuria and Mongolia broke into the lowlands of Hopei; it never formed, however, an absolute limit to Chinese settlement, and for the last two thousand years the northern shore of the Yellow Sea with the hinterland as far as Mukden has been inhabited by Chinese. The northern and central parts of Manchuria, on the other hand, remained up to the nineteenth

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century in the hands of primitive tribes of Mongol or Tungusic speech; sometimes a strong Chinese dynasty would reduce them to subjection, but more often the tribes would form a conquering confederacy or kingdom and bring the Chinese pale under their yoke. Manchuria was thus a country which always contained a strong Chinese element, but still remained a 'frontier' and never became part of the Chinese homeland until quite recently.

To the west Manchuria merges into Mongolia without any very clear definition. The Great Khingan mountains, forming the eastern escarpment of the Mongolian plateau, are to some extent a dividing line, but the Barga district of Heilungkiang lies to the west of the range, while the arid steppe country typical of Mongolia is continued in a large tract to the east of it. Ethnically also the Mongols overflow to the east of the Great Khingan. Broadly speaking, however, there is a strong contrast between the two regions, in that most of Manchuria is arable and well provided with rivers, whereas most of Mongolia is riverless and too arid for cultivation.

It has already been pointed out (Chap. IV) that, as an ultimate result of the Manchu conquest of China, Manchuria became more Chinese than ever before; that the country fell virtually under Russian rule from 1900 to 1904; and that Chinese sovereignty was only imperfectly restored after the Russo-Japanese war. The seeds which came to harvest in 1931 were sown by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Manchuria was recognized as Chinese territory under Chinese administration, but the Russian railway system with its military guards and its 'absolute and exclusive administration of its lands' remained, only it was now shared between Russia and Japan.

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Russia retained the continuation of the Trans-Siberian Railway across North Manchuria (known as the Chinese Eastern Railway—C.E.R.) and the branch from Harbin to the Yellow Sea as far south as Changchun (now Hsinking), while Japan took over the section from Changchun to the port of Dalny (now Dairen). The Japanese line was given the name of the South Manchuria Railway (S.M.R.); it was operated by a company in which the Japanese government owned half the shares and appointed to the highest posts, while the other half of the shares were held mainly by a ring of the biggest family trusts—the so-called *Zaibatsu*. The C.E.R. was always before 1917 under the control of the Russian Ministry of Finance, and from 1924 to 1935 it was the Soviet government which inherited in a modified form the rights of the former Russian company. Both Japan and Russia were therefore deeply involved as states in the affairs of the Manchurian railways, and every transaction of the railway companies tended to become a political issue.

By the treaties and notes of 1915, imposed on China in sequel to the famous 'Twenty-one Demands', the terms of Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory and of the S.M.R. and Antung-Mukden Railway¹ were extended from twenty-five to ninety-nine years from the original dates. Because of the duress under which the concessions were made, the Chinese, in the words of the Lytton Report,² 'continuously denied that these [the 1915 treaties and notes] were binding upon them'. They demanded the abrogation of the 1915 agreements at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, at the Washington

¹ The Antung-Mukden line linked the S.M.R. with the Japanese railway system in Korea.

² *Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of Enquiry*, Geneva, 1932, pp. 49-50.

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Conference in 1921-2, and in a note to Japan in 1923; they maintained, as German nationalists held with regard to the Versailles 'Diktat', that the treaties lacked 'fundamental validity' and so—again to quote the Lytton Report—'they declined to carry out the provisions relating to Manchuria except in so far as circumstances made it expedient to do so'. Circumstances meant, in the first place, the Japanese military units stationed in Kwantung and along the S.M.R. as 'railway guards'—a force with a separate command known as the Kwantung Army.

The C.E.R. was less obnoxious to Chinese nationalists than the S.M.R., but it also was a cause of trouble, especially after the break between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists in China in 1927. There were no longer any Russian railway guards on the C.E.R. after 1917, and under the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 the Chinese participated in the operation of the line. The Russians, however, retained an effective control and made a political use of it, as in 1925, when they supported the revolt of General Kuo Sung-lin against the Manchurian government of Chang Tso-lin.

After Manchuria's acknowledgment of the Nanking government (controlled by the Kuomintang or 'Nationalist' party) as the central government of China, the conflicts of Manchurian railway politics came to a head in the two armed clashes of 1929 and 1931. In the first of these crises the Manchurian Chinese authorities seized the C.E.R. properties, alleging the use of the company offices for Communist propaganda; the Soviet Union responded by concentrating an army on the Manchurian border, invading Manchuria, and compelling the Chinese to restore the *status quo ante* on the railway. The violence in 1931 was wider in

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scope because the threat to the S.M.R. came, not from direct action, as in the case of the C.E.R., but from a system of Chinese-operated lines designed with the aid of through-traffic arrangements and rate-cutting to divert trade from the S.M.R. and Dairen to a Chinese port—Yingkow (Newchwang) or Hulutao on the Gulf of Liaotung.¹ Up to 1929 the S.M.R. had earned monopoly profits from the economic development of South Manchuria, but from that year the intensive state-organized competition of the Chinese lines began to make big inroads on the profitability of the Japanese system and produced a strong demand for a 'positive policy' in Japanese financial circles. The result was the campaign of the Kwantung Army beginning with 'the Incident' of 18 September 1931. At the outset Japanese official and public opinion was divided as to the aims of policy to be pursued in Manchuria, and a compromise settlement with the existing Manchurian authorities, preserving at least the nominal sovereignty of China, was possible up to the end of the year. But the exaltation of easy military success, the growth of a reactionary chauvinist movement inside Japan, and anger at the Chinese refusal to enter into bilateral negotiations² combined to persuade the rulers of Japan to adopt the policy of setting up a separate sovereign state under Japanese military protection in Manchuria.

¹ Some of the Chinese lines had been financed by the S.M.R. as 'feeders', but, having been linked up in the Chinese system, reduced instead of increasing its traffic. The Ssupingkai-Anganchi and Mukden-Kirin were tapped by the Peking-Mukden and Tahushan-Tungliao-Liaoyuan lines.

² The Soviet Union, not being a member of the League of Nations in 1929, insisted on bilateral negotiations and declined to admit any kind of mediation. In 1931 China appealed to the League, and Japan, as a member, could not refuse to plead, though she subsequently disregarded the League's verdict.

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A number of more or less eminent Chinese of Manchuria and certain Mongol princes lent themselves to this scheme, and a Declaration of Independence was published by them on 18 February 1932; the new state, having taken over the civil administration with the assistance of Japanese advisers, was recognized *de jure* by Japan six months later. Recognition was accompanied by a treaty which empowered Japan to station troops throughout the country for the defence of its newly established sovereignty; the Kwantung Army, which had brought Manchukuo into being, thus obtained the right of permanent occupation.

Manchukuo is provided with a monarchy and Chinese ministers and officials, the throne being held by the heir of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty overthrown in China by the revolution of 1911. The substance of power, however, belongs to the commander-in-chief of the Kwantung army, who is also Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo, and thus performs the function of a resident or high commissioner in a protectorate. He resides at Hsinking, formerly Changchun, which is now both the capital of Manchukuo and the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. The central administration of Manchuria was removed from Mukden to Changchun to mark the change of régime, and the latter was almost entirely rebuilt to give it the aspect and facilities of a capital city; at the same time the four old provinces of Liaoning, Kirin, Heilungkiang and Jehol were split up to make new divisions with new names, so that the political map of the country has been quite transformed since 1931 (see map 18).


By the action of 1931 the Japanese not only averted the danger to the S.M.R. from politically promoted Chinese competition, but were able themselves to obtain control of the Chinese-operated

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railways and unite them with the S.M.R. in a single system. Nor was the victory of the S.M.R. restricted to its former domain in South Manchuria. Just two months after the Mukden incident a Japanese column occupied Tsitsihar in Heilungkiang, thus cutting across the Soviet-controlled C.E.R. The Soviet Union, paralysed for the time being by the stresses of the first Five-year Plan, could not risk military counter-measures, and remained passive while the Kwantung Army took possession of North Manchuria up to the Amur. The potential strategic value of the C.E.R. as a short cut to Vladivostok having been destroyed by the Japanese advance, the Soviet government decided to cut its losses, and finally sold its interest in the C.E.R. to Manchukuo in 1935.

With the acquisition of the C.E.R. all the railways of Manchuria came under a unified Japanese management. There was in 1931 a total railway mileage of 4,000; over 2,000 miles of new lines have been constructed since then by the Japanese. Three of the new railways have special strategic, as well as economic, significance. One continues the Dairen-Harbin line north to Heiho on the Amur opposite the Russian town of Blagoveshchensk; a second supplements the old Peking-Mukden line by an inland route *via* Jehol (completed early this year); and a third runs from Rashin on the Korean coast a little way south of the Siberian border to Hsinking, with branches north to Harbin and to Sanchiang province, thus giving Japan railway access to Manchuria from the Japan Sea as well as from the Yellow Sea.


Before 1931 Japan had land frontiers with the Soviet Union only in Karafuto and for a very short stretch in the extreme north-east of Korea. With the conquest of Manchuria she took



16. MANCHURIAN RAILWAYS 1938

NOTE ON MAP 17

Vladivostok was founded on an uninhabited site in 1860; Rashin has been developed from a fishing village into a major port within the last five years. Between Yuki and Kunju the railway from Rashin into Manchukuo runs close to the southwestern extremity of Soviet territory. Serious fighting took place for ten days from 29 July 1938 over rival claims to the hill of Changkufeng between the Tumen river and Lake Khasan. The Russians claim that the map attached to a Russo-Chinese border-demarcation treaty of 1886 shows that the hill belongs to them, though it is not apparently marked by name on this map; the Japanese protest that this map was never communicated to Japan with other Russo-Chinese secret agreements at the time of the *entente* of 1911 and that maps prepared by the Russian Imperial General Staff leave the hill on the Chinese side of the frontier. It seems that a serious attempt is now being made to arrive at a final demarcation of the boundary in this area.



17. VLADIVOSTOK AND RASHIN

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over 1,500 miles of China's Siberian boundary, and the fact that this boundary had never been precisely demarcated gave plenty of opportunity for border incidents between the armed forces of two Great Powers on very bad terms with each other. The greater part of the frontier was formed by the Amur and Ussuri rivers, but even in the river sections there were islands in dispute, and at each end, near the Japan Sea in the east and towards the edge of Mongolia in the west, there were no rivers to separate the Japanese and Russian outposts. In these circumstances skirmishes have been frequent during the last few years and they have served as trials of strength, willingness to risk general hostilities being measured by truculence of attitude in each case. In June 1937 a fight broke out over possession of an island in the Amur and the Russians withdrew after losing a gunboat sunk by shell fire; this was soon after the execution of Tukhachevsky and other Red Army generals in Moscow, and the Japanese army leaders were encouraged by the exhibition of Russian weakness to bring matters to a head in North China. This year, with the Japanese deeply involved in their war in China, the tables have been turned on the Siberian border, and it is now the turn of the Russians to press menacingly on the Japanese. The aim of Soviet policy is to embarrass the Japanese campaign in China by immobilizing as many Japanese troops as possible on the Manchukuo border; strategically the most sensitive spot on the line for Japan (though not for Russia) is where the tongue of Russian territory along the coast southwest of Vladivostok approaches Japan's new artery of communication with Manchukuo, the Rashin-Harbin railway. It is at this point that fighting has recently been going on. (See map 17 and note.)

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The Kwantung Army has a scheme for settling Japanese emigrants, mostly ex-service men, in the provinces of Heiho and Sanchiang near the Amur; there is still much unoccupied land in the far north of Manchuria, and it is here that there is most need for a co-national rural population to support the military garrisons. The scheme provides for the settlement of a million families in twenty years from 1936. So far Japanese colonization in these regions has not prospered, for the conditions of life are very different from those in Japan, and financial assistance for the settlers is likely to be exiguous in the near future, whatever the outcome of the war in China.

As yet only about ten per cent of the population of Manchukuo is to be found in the northern half of the country. Economic life is still concentrated in the south near the Yellow Sea. Here is not only the richest and most closely settled agricultural land, with wheat and soya beans as its main products, but also the Mukden industrial area based on the coal and iron ore of Fengtien province. The centre of coal production is at Fushun, a little way to the east of Mukden; to the south is Anshan, site of the Showa Steel Works, now Japan's largest heavy industrial plant. The development of this industrial area under complete Japanese control has undoubtedly strengthened Japan both from an economic and from a military point of view. Fengtien heavy industry is, however, subject to certain drawbacks which cannot be eliminated either by political control or administrative energy. Manchuria has large coal reserves, but is deficient in good coking coal for metallurgical purposes, and its abundant iron ore is almost everywhere of low grade and costly to work. Good coking coal, on the other hand, is produced in Hopei and Shantung in North China, and fairly large reserves of high-

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grade iron ore exist in Chahar to the west of Jehol. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria thus left China still with a great potential advantage in heavy industry and all it implies, if she were to undertake seriously the exploitation of her coal and iron resources. Such considerations counted for much in persuading the Kwantung Army to extend the 'manifest destiny' from Manchuria to Inner Mongolia and North China.